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ABSTRACT
Logistics is a major challenge for multinational corporations seeking to do business in China.
Transportation and warehousing are two core activities of logistics which will have to be
outsourced or produced internally by foreign firms entering the China market. This paper
focuses on road and rail transportation, the primary forms of transport utilized to move
finished goods, as well as the warehousing and distribution center service sector.
Trucking services and costs are observed to be poor by Western standards. There is no
established less-than-truckload (LTL) industry and there are limited trucking networks
offering one stop shipping across the country. None the less, trucking will have to be the
backbone of any distribution network in China for finished products. Rail service is even
poorer. There are capacity constraints and finished goods movement is not a priority of the
Chinese railways. Warehousing capacity inherited from state owned enterprises is
inadequate, but new distribution centers are being built rapidly.
Foreign firms need to recognize these limitations in service, capabilities and capacity in
planning their distribution networks. The fragmented nature of both the trucking and
warehousing sectors places a premium on the value added by third party logistics providers
(3PL’s) who have the knowledge and the relationships with local trucking and warehouse
firms to minimize the risk of a supply chain breakdown. The selection of logistics suppliers
is the most critical logistics decision in the Chinese environment.
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INTRODUCTION
China has enjoyed significant economic growth
leading to a position in the world as a global
manufacturing center with the ability to produce
quality products of all types, at a cost and degree
of efficiency that is difficult to match in most
other countries. Companies who have produced
products in other parts of Asia, such as Hong
Kong and Taiwan, have shifted their manufac
turing to China. Firms which once found Mexico
to be a low cost manufacturing location have
begun to relocate production to China. Many of
these firms are multi-national corporations
(MNC’s), outsourcing their manufacturing, or
international retailers who are sourcing products
for consumption in Europe and North America.
In addition, production is increasingly relocated
in China as the basis for penetrating the growing
domestic market within China itself and the rest
of Asia.
The quality and cost of transportation and
logistics services are important factors in con
sidering the role of China as a source of products
or materials, as a manufacturing location, or as
a market for products. MNC’s need to assess how
products will be moved to and from locations in
China to determine the total landed cost of
sourcing products or contracting production in
China. Sourcing from or manufacturing in China
may result in longer, more variable supply lines
that affect product availability and
responsiveness of the supply chain. This, in turn,
may require increased inventories or dependence
on premium transportation. Firms that are
seeking to enter China to market their products
must recognize the logistical capabilities that
exist in China and adapt their manufacturing
and distribution strategies accordingly.
Most of the economic growth of China has been
in coastal regions, specifically around three major
metropolitan areas: Guangdong, Shanghai and
Beijing/Tianjin. Much of the initial foreign
investment, sourcing and manufacturing subcon
tracting is concentrated in these areas. Further,
these regions have become significant consump
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tion centers as the income and local population
have grown with the increase in industrial
output. These industrial areas are relatively well
served by modern sea and air ports and the most
highly developed highways in China surround
these cities. Transportation and logistics service
is available from domestic, foreign and joint ven
ture logistics service suppliers, competing for
international and local freight movement. In
contrast, the domestic transportation and logis
tics system connecting these regions to each
other is not so well developed and the logistics
system connecting these regions to inland China
is even less developed. The quantity and quality
of domestic logistics services will become increa
singly important as the sourcing and production
of finished products moves further inland. This
is occurring because of growing income and cost
disparities between regions in China, making
coastal locations more expensive for business. In
addition, central government is actively pro
moting more balanced development across the
country. As other geographic regions of China
develop, comparative and absolute advantages of
each region will emerge. Supply chains requiring
intercity and interregional product flows will
grow. Finally, domestic logistics is growing in
importance as the non-coastal retail markets
develop.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the
status of selected logistics service sectors within
China for the movement of finished (non-bulk)
goods. This may be purely domestic movement or
movement of products moving internationally
but with a significant inland portion. Transpor
tation and warehousing are two core activities of
logistics which will have to be outsourced or
produced internally by foreign firms entering the
China market. The focus here is on road and rail
transportation, the primary forms of transport
utilized to move finished goods, as well as the
warehousing and distribution center service
sector. An attempt is made to appraise the
current situation, the underlying problems and
opportunities, and the implications for the
logistics strategy of foreign firms operating in
China.

MACRO-LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE IN
CHINA
Numerous studies have found that logistics costs
are comparatively higher in China than in most
other developed countries. The Logistics Institute-Asia Pacific (2002) estimated that logistics
costs were between 16 and 20% of China’s GDP
but only 12% for Japan, 10% for Europe and
9.9% in the US in 1999. An estimate of 16.7% of
GDP is given by Wang (2004) who also indicates
that during the tenth five-year plan period, the
nation’s goal is to decrease logistics costs to 15%
of GDP, providing an annual savings of 240
billion.1 This aggregate productivity is corrobor
ated by more specific evidence. Morgan Stanley
estimates that logistics costs are 40% of total
industry product costs in China versus 20% in
the U.S. and only 5 to 8% for most MNC’s, and
that accumulated inventory to GDP is 50% in
China versus 4% in the U.S. (Ho and Lim, 2001).
Mao, He, and Wang ( 2004) add that not only do
logistics costs account for more than 40% of the
total costs of goods, if the costs of packing,
transportation, storage and damage resulting
from improper transportation and handling are
added, logistics costs would exceed 60% of total
costs. Ho and Lim (2001) find that electronics
and food products cost 40- 50% more to ship in
China than in North America. They conclude
that the Chinese logistics sector is a “huge
market calling for efficiency.”
The failing of China’s logistics sector is also
reflected in perceived service levels. Poor
handling and transportation protection is
reflected in the higher cost of logistics quoted
above by Mao et al. (2004). According to a study
by the China Association of Warehouses and
Storage in 2001, the goods damage rate for all
modes of transport exceeded 2% and on-time
delivery was less than 90%. The survey found
that 57% of the manufacturing corporations
surveyed were dissatisfied with their present
logistics outsourcing service, and would seek new
logistics service providers in the following year.
This showed that most logistics enterprises
cannot meet the service standard of the modern
logistics market (Ma and Shi, 2004).

China’s logistics services sector is composed of
third party logistics (3PL) firms, various modes
of transport and the providers of warehousing
and distribution center services. In the following
sections, the road, rail and warehousing/distribu
tion center segments are examined. These are
the building blocks upon which most MNC’s will
have to rely for basic logistics services whether
provided through a 3PL or directly by such
providers.

TRUCKING SERVICE AND
PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES
FOR MNC’s
The Role of Trucking in China
Trucking is the most widely used mode of trans
port in the world for moving packaged or
finished goods and this is no less true in China
(Easton, 2003). As reported in Table 1, trucking
accounted for almost 10 billion tons of freight or
about 77% of the country’s tonnage in 1999.
However, trucking is traditionally used for short
haul movement less than 500 kilometers with
the average ton moving only 59.9 kilometers in
1999. Urban congestion is a problem for such
short haul movements, but intercity long haul
trucking is the bigger challenge for MNC’s as
production moves inland and many multi
national corporations expand their domestic
networks. The lack of efficient and effective
intercity truck service is one of the most urgent
logistics challenges in China.

China’s Trucking Industry and Regulation
China’s trucking industry is highly fragmented,
with more than 5.4 million trucks registered to
more than two million truckers and little or low
entry barriers (Easton, 2003). Companies tend to
be small scale, with the average trucking
company having fewer than two units. For
example, the Hubei province has 28,600
operators, but each has an average of only 1.43
vehicles. Heilongjiang province has 117,911
registered vehicles and each operator has less
than 1.6 vehicles (Xu, 2004). Sinotrans is the
largest trucking operator in China with only
Fall 2004
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TABLE 1
FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION IN CHINA
Mode

Tonkilometers
(Billions, 2002)

Tons
(Billions,1999)

Road

678.3

9.904

58

1351.7

Rail

1551.6

1.672

768

57.9*1

Water

2751.1

1.146

1855

116.5

5.2

.017

2482

1522.22

Air

Average
Length of Haul
(KM, 1999)

Kilometers of
routes (1000,
1999)

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2003, Ho and Lim 2001
1 Excludes electrified railways
2 Excludes international routes

3000 registered vehicles specializing in long
distance.
The legacy of the planned economy was that
most state-owned enterprises (SOE) were ver
tically integrated, and had their own private
fleets that operated at very low vehicle utiliza
tion rates (Ho and Lim, 2001). Many SOE’s
produced and distributed their products region
ally or locally and when long distance transport
was needed, rail was utilized. These private
fleets entered the for-hire market in the 1990’s
and early 2000’s, providing a vast supply of
trucking services locally and regionally.
A complicated licensing system restricts competi
tion in the trucking industry. At the national
level, the Ministry of Transport requires every
service provider to obtain a national truck
license. Each provincial government requires a
license in the province of origin of the vehicle
operation (e.g., the domicile of the operation). In
most cities a local transportation bureau re
quires a local truck title for the purchase of a
truck and its registration. Finally, the local
police authority will require a local truck opera
ting license to provide transport services within
48
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a city (Hertzell, 2001). Even permission at the
national level is no guarantee that local regula
tions will not prevent a national company from
operating in many provinces or cities.
There are few nationwide trucking companies
able to offer integrated, one-stop shopping for
truck services. Those that exist are not inte
grated carriers, but generally networks of long
haul and local trucking companies. Inefficiency
in the form of interlining is caused to a large
degree by local protectionism. Long haul freight
may mean loading and unloading at provincial
borders as it is handled from carrier to carrier
(Trunick, 2003).
Today in many localities, out of province
trucks are arbitrarily stopped at city
borders and subjected to tolls that local
trucks don’t pay, or to flat restrictions on
completing delivery. In many cases this
requires an entire truckload to be un
loaded and reloaded onto a local truck.
This costs both time and money, and also
creates opportunities for local protection
ism and corruption, (American Chamber,
2002 and 2003).

For example, non-Shanghai trucks are pro
hibited from entering Shanghai during the 7 am
to 11 pm period due to traffic control, while
Shanghai licensed trucks have limited access (Ho
and Lim, 2001). Permits are also very costly and
road tolls are high, with some tolls unauthorized.
It is estimated that tolls make up 15-20% of the
trucking costs in many traffic lanes compared to
2-3% in Europe (Drewry, 2003). Regulations
equivalent to the Interstate Commerce Act in the
U.S. do not exist to support free and efficient
movement between different cities or states in
China. Reform of the highly bureaucratic and
restrictive licensing systems seems unlikely in
the short run because local provinces would lose
a significant source of tax revenue (Drewry,
2003).
In summary, the fragmented nature of the
industry, the regulatory restrictions and his
torical lack of demand for for-hire trucking due
to SOE trucking, has provided little opportunity
or incentive for developing an integrated truck
netwrork across China.
Less-than-truckload (LTL) operations, w^hich
involve consolidation of many small shipments
into large line haul vehicles, is inherently a net
work operation. Due the lack of an integrated
truck network, shipping partial loads is difficult
(Modern Materials Handling, 2002). What LTL
services do exist are limited to very long dis
tances where some co-loading takes place.
Unless the co-loading is well planned, transit
times are usually long and inconsistent, especi
ally on inland routes (Pinnekamp, 2003). The
result is that manufacturers usually do not move
small loads over long distances and the existing
practice in China is that almost all intercity
cargo moves as full vehicle loads. What is
variable is the size of the vehicle. If the load is 5
tons, then a 5-ton truck is used, and if the load is
8 tons, an 8-ton truck is used and so on. The
consequence of industry fragmentation and the
heritage of SOE trucking is that an integrated
LTL industry has yet to develop and mature.

Trucking Performance and Operating
Practices
Direct transportation and, in particular, trucking
costs are not high by international standards but
are high as a percentage of the total cost of the
product. Unfortunately, the costs of trucking are
often minimized through operating practices that
are unlawful, unsafe or sacrifice service quality.
As a result, the total logistics cost becomes a
barrier to profitably doing business in China.
Truck service is frequently evaluated as unreli
able when it is cheap, and reliable when it is
expensive. The absence of an effective network is
a barrier for filling backhauls, thereby requiring
the purchase of round trip capacity. This is
exacerbated by natural imbalances in freight
movement. Front hauls from the coast to western
China tend to be finished goods and consumer
goods while front hauls from western China to
the coast are bulk products. Refrigerated
vehicles going west typically run back empty.
Door to door service of dry goods to and from top
tier cities is easiest and cheapest, but trucking to
second tier cities and for specialized commodities
such as refrigerated or dangerous goods is much
harder. LTL reliability is compromised by the
tendency to delay schedules until full loads are
accumulated, unless of course the shipper is
willing to pay the premium for under loaded line
haul movement. Furthermore, the low volume of
consolidated LTL freight results in the utiliza
tion of small, inefficient line haul vehicles, at
least by Western standards.
Although there are large fleets of modern
tractors pulling chassis for containers at port
cities, the majority of the road equipment is
substandard. Historically, trucks were open-back
and tarpaulin-covered with poor protection for
goods (Alberts, Randall, and Asbury, 1997). Due
to the small size of most operators, very few of
these trucks are set up to move containerized
freight with only 20% of freight trucks in China
being containerized (Ho and Lim, 2001).2 Very
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few of these companies can afford to upgrade
their equipment because of limited access to
capital. Shipments are often hand loaded and
unloaded (Pinnekamp, 2003), and people loading
trucks sometimes lack the training or initiative
to pack a truck in an effective and efficient
manner. This leads to cargo damage from cargo
shifting and movement which is compounded by
the lack of pallet standardization, leading to
longer truck loading and unloading times, more
cargo shifting and less efficiency.
Many transport vehicles are moving overloaded.
It is an issue that almost anyone moving
products in China will encounter. Transporters,
as a norm, are known to haul 50% in excess of
their legal payload, and sometimes as high as
three times their legal limit. This is more the
standard business practice than the exception
with companies in China taking advantage of
this cost savings despite the inherent problems
that result. Recently, new legislation was applied
evenly across state and local levels whereby
haulers have to pay RMB 200 for every vehicle
overloaded by 30% and about RMB 400 for each
overloaded by 50%. Previously fines were a maxi
mum of RMB 50 for each overloaded vehicle.
Before the clampdown, haulers would
modify and strengthen their vehicles to
carry up to double the legal weight capa
city. Checks were also not as stringent
then ... now they are conducting checks at
toll stations and trucks found to be
overloaded will be forced to unload excess
cargo on the spot (Viswanathan, 2004).
For those firms which cannot risk violating the
law, costs will inevitably rise. SembCorp Logis
tics (2004) reported that their China operations
had been impacted by rising costs of road trans
portation services brought on by the Chinese
government’s initiative to control the overloading
of trucks. Multinational chemical companies
have found that their transport costs had gone
up for the same reason.
Fierce and destructive competition between
carriers continues to make the whole industry
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unprofitable. When competitors can obtain old
and frequently unsafe trucks to move goods, they
compete with trucks which are fully depreciated.
The cost structure of these competitors is very
low compared to operators that purchase newer
equipment in order to meet or exceed standards
of safe operation (American Chamber, 2002). The
costs of trucks have been rising due to more
stringent emissions standards as well as the
demand for newer, safer equipment. Many of the
smaller operators do not have the capital to
make such investments. However, government
enforcement of regulations, such as annual ve
hicle inspections has increased the pressure to
buy newer equipment.
Shippers have difficulties in tracking freight
while in transit by road. For most Chinese
trucking firms, the cost of installing a satellite
tracking system is too high. Cheaper alternatives
for track and trace such as mobile locators and
telephone call monitoring are being improved
and developed. Statistics validate the benefits of
adopting new information technology.
Among the 200 logistics service providers
in Xian, the 72 highway transportation
operators that included (integrated) com
munication services as part of their
overall services had better business
performance (Xu, 2004).

Highway and Trucking Infrastructure
In the past, poor trucking service has been the
result of a poorly developed highway infra
structure. For example, during the mid 1990’s, it
was observed that a team of two drivers working
16-hour days could be expected to cover only 496
miles per day, a rate of less than 32 miles per
hour (Alberts et al., 1997). However, this has
rapidly improved in the last decade. There has
been substantial improvement with the Chinese
government (Ministry of Communications) in
vesting billions of dollars on new highways. In
2003, the Chinese highway network consisted of
more than 1.3 million kilometers, with 0.2 million
additional kilometers scheduled for completion
in 2005, making up a national network of nearly

1.5 million kilometers. The National Truck
Highway program has over 35,000 kilometers of
toll roads with a total of five vertical and seven
horizontal national routes scheduled for comple
tion by 2015 (Institute of Highway Economics,
2003). The trip from Shanghai to Guangzhou, for
example, has been reduced from three to five
days to 36 hours with two drivers, thanks to
newly constructed expressways (Wu, 2003).
Road quality will continue to vary in such a vast
country. Larger cities and coastal regions have
decent roads and highways, while western
regions and less developed interior areas of the
country need major upgrading. The mountainous
and desert terrain will always be a problem.
Twenty-five percent of villages still have no
access to suitable roads. However, the Chinese
government has planned a considerable increase
in highway investment for the western region
(Institute of Highway Economics, 2003). Despite
the government’s increasing expenditures on
new roads, many of the existing roads are still in
poor condition or remain unpaved. Thus, average
travel speed is quite slow compared to North
American standards. It will be many years
before the practical speeds and transit times
within China will be comparable to speeds in
North America and Europe for comparable
distances.
In addition to building roads, the Ministry of
Communications has planned to build 45 main
road hubs in central cities, as well as cargo con
centration and distribution centers throughout
the country (Institute of Highway Economics,
2003). These would form the fixed nodes in a
national logistics network, facilitating freight
transfer, consolidation and communication.

The Prospects for Trucking in China
Highway infrastructure barriers are being re
duced through massive building programs but
the real barrier that needs improvement is how
the trucking industry that utilizes the highways
is managed and organized. The majority of the
trucking industry is too fragmented to meet the
demands of modern large scale production. The

majority of the industry cannot offer one-stop
shopping, door-to-door shipment visibility or
nationwide LTL services frequently demanded
by MNC’s moving finished products. The
potential for loss and damage, unreliable service
and slow transit times must always be con
sidered by MNC’s in choosing trucking service
providers and designing a distribution network
in China. MNC’s need to exercise a significant
amount of due diligence in selecting their
Chinese trucking suppliers.
Since January 1, 2001, with China’s entry into
the WTO, foreign companies were allowed to
establish jointly-owned firms with local com
panies to enter the highway transportation
market. From 2003 onward, foreign investors are
allowed to be sole proprietors of highway
transport companies, and both sole proprietors
(local or foreign-owned) and local joint ventures
can enjoy the same privileges. This has increased
competition within China’s highway transport
sector. These new entrants will bring new capital
and new technology, and bring more experience
and advanced business management techniques
into the trucking sector (Zhou, Zhu, and Xiao,
2001). However, this will only bring marginal
improvements if the regulatory and licensing
impediments to developing a truly integrated
network for a trucking firm cannot be reduced.
The root cause of many operational inefficiencies
is the provincial and local restrictions that have
limited cross province movement of freight.

RAIL: ANOTHER LOGISTICS
CHALLENGE FOR MNC’s
Rail’s Role in China
Rail is the second most utilized mode of trans
port in China with respect to tonnage, moving
1.7 billion tons, or about 13% of total
transportation tonnage in 1999 (see Table 1).
Rail is the main mode of transport in terms of
ton kilometers since the average length of haul
by rail is more than 13 times the distance by
truck. The core of the rail system was built for
and is the lifeline for moving bulk goods such as
Fall 2004
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coal, minerals, and grain, but it is unsuited for
transporting finished goods or perishables
(Hertzell, 2001; Wu, 2003). Extensive delays,
inflexibility, and lack of service orientation have
prevented both domestic and international users
from using rail, and this is exacerbated by the
lack of rail sidings at both plants and ports.
Surveys consistently find that foreign joint ven
tures use rail even less than domestic companies.

China’s Rail Industry and Regulation
The rail industry is highly concentrated, with the
Ministry of Railways (MOR) controlling most of
the country’s rail service under the China Rail
umbrella (Easton, 2003). Many vestiges of
operating as a firm in a traditional planned
economic system remain. Therefore, organiza
tional and managerial reforms will be more
difficult in this transport sector (Network &
Information, 2001).
The MOR has made progress.
Three years into the ninth five-year plan,
the China rail system was restructured
and major non-transportation enterprises
were spun off including rail engineering,
rail construction, locomotive vehicle build
ing, communication signaling and civil
engineering, ten higher education insti
tutes, and other vocation training or adult
education schools. MOR has opened 227
independent stations. The MOR was
downsized by 320,000 people in this pro
cess. The MOR, in the tenth five-year
plan, will try to improve its transportation
and service standard. MOR aims to set up
a comprehensive network throughout the
nation for passenger transport to accom
plish the goals for “out by dawn, in by
dusk” within 500 km, “out by dusk, in by
dawn” within the 1,200-1,500 km range,
and “arrival in one day” if traveling within
2000-2500km. For goods transportation,
the goals are to improve delivery time,
develop express delivery systems, and
explore and utilize modern management
models to provide complete door to door
52

Journal of Transportation Management

transport service. MOR aims to speed up
the development in consolidated transport
and refrigerated transport in order to
expand market availability for new
economic growth. To accomplish these
goals, MOR will speed up the construction
of western railways to strengthen its
“eight horizontal and eight vertical” net
work during the tenth five-year plan. Near
the end of this tenth five-year period, the
national track network will cover 75,000
km, including the new expansion of over
2.000 km in the West. Express tracks will
increase to over 14,000 km, double tracks
to 25,000 km and electrical tracks to about
20.000 km. The tenth five-year plan will
adopt new technologies including railway
modernization, improving IT and com
munication systems, and setting up safety
and security standards, etc., diminishing
the shortcomings of traditional railway
transport (Translated from Chinese,
Network & Information, 2001).
Organizational impediments may have been as
significant as infrastructure. In the past, each of
the MOR’s regional divisions prohibited their
locomotives from crossing divisional boundaries in
order to retain control over their key equipment.
This increased transit time and trip variability.
The MOR recently converted its 14 geographical
administrations into semi-autonomous legal enti
ties. Each administration manages and operates
the assets (infrastructure and rolling stock)
allocated, while the MOR carries out overall
coordination of inter-administration traffic. This
decentralization does not appear to have ad
dressed the power switching issue. Furthermore,
the State Planning Commission (as opposed to
the MOR) controls the prioritization of industries
receiving rail service (Alberts et al., 1997).

Rail Performance and Operating Practices
Numerous studies have documented the failings
of the Chinese railway system with respect to
the movement of non-bulk goods and perishables
(Hertzell, 2001; Ho and Lim, 2001; Wu, 2003).
Cost is not one of these failings. Rail cost is

substantially lower than truck cost, not only
because of the economic features of rail, but
because the state-owned railway is subsidized.
However, low costs are more than offset by poor
service in the movement of finished goods.
Railroad service is viewed as inefficient and
unreliable, and is mostly used to ship cargos that
are not needed urgently. Transit times are long
and service reliability is poor (Ho and Lim,
2001). Wu (2003) notes that some cross country
deliveries take up to 60 days, which is too slow
for goods such as perishables or anything of high
value. More importantly, train service is not
responsive, with long lead times for services. On
frequently serviced routes, such as Beijing to
Shanghai, bookings can be made a week in
advance (Ho and Lim, 2001). For less than
carload, two weeks advance booking is required
(Hertzell, 2001). For less frequent routes, such as
to and from Xinjiang, bookings generally need to
be made 30 to 40 days in advance (Alberts et al.,
1997; Wu, 2003).
Shipment delays are common and the railways
are plagued with seasonal capacity shortages.
The general policy is to give priority to passen
gers and then to basic commodities from the
agricultural and extraction industries. Forty
percent of rail capacity is taken up by the coal
industry, resulting in unmet demand for rail
movement from the agriculture sector during the
harvest season. This policy results in seasonal
availability of services to other shippers as well.
Passengers traveling during the long holidays in
May, October, and the New Year, coupled with
agriculture shipments, result in reduced capacity
for the movement of packaged or finished goods
(Ho and Lim, 2001). During harvest season, for
example, lower density routes require a month to
a month and a half advance booking for space
(Drewry, 2003). A Chinese firm reported that
extra payments may be demanded by local rail
line operators to make box cars available or to
give priority to a cargo during high traffic
periods (Wu, 2003). Recently, general merchan

dise has been accorded a much higher priority in
the MOR’s booking system and container block
trains have the highest priority within this
general cargo sector (Drewry, 2003).
Railways have very few connections to industrial
parks and seaports or sidings at manufacturing
plants. This means that practically all finished
goods moving by rail have to be unloaded and
reloaded onto trucks for final delivery. The extra
handling results in added exposure to loss and
damage. The damage rate on rail is 2-3 times
higher than trucking (Hertzell, 2001). Damage
usually occurs when goods are transferred from
rail to local trucking and is most typically due to
transportation workers who are not adequately
trained in handling sensitive goods (Wu, 2003).
Theft is an endemic problem. This has led manu
facturers to employ their own security guards on
trains to safeguard goods (Wu, 2003).
Poor information systems make it almost impos
sible to track goods in transit. There are few
services such as notification of arrival at rail
stations, automated car tracking, and integrated
information technology between the provincial
railways. Loss of refrigeration after reconfigura
tion of compartments at changeovers is also
common. Several of these deficiencies appear to
stem from the regionalized operating structure of
the Chinese railways.
Until recently, most rail cars were 60-ton closed
boxcars and containerization was limited (Al
berts et al., 1997). A small fleet of five to ten-ton
domestic containers that fit onto open-top
railcars has recently been introduced and the
flatcar fleet is being expanded to handle more
maritime containers. In general, however, rail
way containers are not compatible with those
used by shipping companies, and overseas
shipments require the unloading and reloading
of cargo (Alberts et al., 1997; Wu, 2003). Cargoes
have to be unloaded and reloaded when using
rail, resulting in higher handling costs and
higher damage rates.

Fall 2004

53

Rail Infrastructure
In contrast to trucking, China’s rail infrastruc
ture continues to be a significant part of the
problem. China now boasts railways of 73,000
km when electrified track is included (Wah,
2004). Although about 27% of this total is double
tracked, capacity is still less than demand, and
the rail freight infrastructure has yet to meet
containerized multimodal transport demand.
Rail system modernization is lagging behind
road development, although plans to expand in
the West are in place. There is little intermodal
capability in China, although this area has been
targeted for improvement (Government of Cana
da, 2003). In 2003 there were more than 100
joint venture railway lines including Maersk,
Orient Overseas Container Lines, U-Freight and
DHL, operating trial joint ventures with SOE’s.
Foreign rail operators often bring specialized
services and new technology, and this will in
crease as WTO commitments encourage foreign
investors to enter the rail sector. As of 2004,
foreign majority shares in rail joint ventures
were allowed and the entire domestic rail cargo
sector will be fully opened to foreign investment
in 2006 under a WTO agreement (Wu, 2003).

The Prospects for Rail in China
Rail in China will improve but it cannot be
depended upon to be a core transportation
provider for finished goods across China. The
railway continues to be an SOE with the
traditional political, organizational, and human
resource constraints that impede streamlining
operations and making the service-operations
mix more market responsive. Many of rail’s
failings can be traced to economic policies (prior
itization of freight), lack of infrastructure
(tracks, loading facilities), and organization
(regional administration), but the basic fact of
life is that the majority of China’s rail system is
run by an SOE which holds a monopoly on
intercity rail service. Commercialization of the
enterprise is needed, including incentives for
productivity and customer service.
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The WTO will require changes in this situation
but, while deregulation is in the future, there is
little or no potential for privatization in the near
term. It appears that the state-owned enterprise
in rail will remain, but it will welcome foreign
investment. China’s rail system will be under
pressure to restructure to attract more com
mercial business and to achieve higher efficiency.
One restructuring plan is to establish separate
market oriented corporations to manage freight
transport, passenger transport and railway
infrastructure. Authorities will most likely
release control of the transportation of general
merchandise and free up prices in incremental
steps (Ho and Lim, 2001).
MNC’s must recognize the limitations of China’s
railway system as their economic activities move
further inland and into Western China. Unlike
the U.S. and Europe, a well-developed inter
modal system does not exist, so long distance
transport of volume shipments will continue to
depend on much costlier trucking. Much longer
lead times must be planned for when using rail.
On less congested routes, companies have plan
ned around a one week delivery window. On
congested routes, a four-week arrival window is
more common. Interestingly, this has led some
Chinese firms to prefer an imported product to a
domestic product in part due to the unreliability
of domestic rail transportation (Wu, 2003).
Some third party logistics providers have by
passed the rail capacity and service problem by
contracting out rail capacity. G-time Logistics,
which had a long relationship with the MOR, has
chartered rail services on North-South routes,
carrying fresh food and products from the South,
and grains from the North. This is similar to the
situation in the U.S. in the 1970’s and early
1980’s, when confronted with poor rail service,
APL chartered rail service to go from the West to
East coast of the U.S. in land bridge service.
Interestingly, APL Logistics, now a whollyowned subsidiary of Neptune Orient Lines, is in
the process of doing the same in China. They
signed a memorandum of understanding with

Eastern China Railway Express to take advant
age of the railway supply chain network with
160 rail hubs. Other heavy users of rail are third
party providers such as Bao Gong, PG Logistics
and St. Anda (Chow, Wang, Xu, and Ding, 2003),
who all have the scale to charter rail routes to
get better control on scheduling and operations.
In short, large customers and 3PL’s who can
aggregate rail freight can contract the train
service out to get reliable rail service and
assured capacity. MNC’s should consider this
option if they have the volume, or leverage 3PL’s
that have established these contracts.

WAREHOUSING AND
DISTRIBUTION CENTER SERVICES
Warehousing in China
Traditional warehousing in China focuses on
long-term storage of raw materials and
manufactured goods that are held as stock that
companies sell. These warehousing facilities
barely meet the needs of these “push” type sup
ply chains, much less the needs of MNC’s and
progressive Chinese firms whose supply chains
need to be responsive and agile.
Ninety percent of China’s warehousing capacity
is controlled by SOE’s (Easton, 2003). Up to the
mid-1980’s, SOE’s all used private warehousing.
By 1985, they realized that they had excess
capacity and started selling warehouse services
commercially. This warehouse space was gener
ally located and designed for a specific company.
Thus, while there was actually a lot of ware
house space, much of it was not up to standard
or in the right location. Since most SOE’s owned
their own space, there was little demand for
commercial warehousing and this sector remained
underdeveloped. Furthermore, most SOE’s served
regional markets, with few formal regional ware
house networks and, until recently, no formal
national network of public warehouses.
The major exceptions were the state-owned
transportation companies that owned and
operated warehouses to supplement their trans
portation operations. Sinotrans is the largest

freight forwarding company in China controlling
more than three million square meters of
warehousing space. Guo (2001) notes that China
Rail offers “an extensive network throughout
China and adequate warehousing facilities are
available at or near rail stations in most cities.”
China Material Storage and Transportation
Company operates warehousing and trucking
across the country. In addition, 3PL’s often
provide warehouse service as part of their fulfill
ment services. A recent survey of 3PL’s operating
in China indicates that approximately 32% con
tract out warehousing, but most build their own
facilities (Dai, Wang, Wong, Wang, and Xiaohong, 2003).

Warehousing Performance and Operating
Practices
Most of the warehousing capacity built before the
mid 1990’s was for bulk cargo and many are multi
story facilities. These warehouses are poorly
designed, use little automation, and are highly
dependent on manual labor. Poor information
systems lead to inaccurate stock counts and high
loss rates. Lack of integration between ware
housing and transportation service makes it
difficult to achieve shipment visibility across the
whole supply chain. There is little racking and
modern inventory management is absent.
Weather protection from heat, rain or snow is
minimal. The result of these poor designs is inef
ficient material flow, including multiple manual
handling which leads to high damage and
pilferage rates.
A case study of the type of warehousing available
to an MNC in northeastern China (outside of the
major metro areas of Shanghai, Beijing/Tianjin
and Guangdong) is a joint venture automobile
plant which did not have enough storage facili
ties at the plant site. The existing plant complex
could not be expanded to provide storage space,
but stor-age space was available at a nearby
military base. However, the warehouses were
vintage 1930’s buildings built by the Japanese
during their occupation. They had poor electri
city, poor temperature control, substandard pest
control, little shelving, and were multi-storied.
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They contained no automation to facilitate
movement (Pinnekamp, 2003).
Palletization is not common in Chinese ware
housing. The older warehouses are not designed
for fork lift equipment and the incentive to use
pallets seems to be missing from SOE’s. More
importantly, there is no standard pallet size in
China. China uses all the different types of
pallets from different countries, though the
European 1,000 mm by 1,200 mm pallet is most
widely used. Utilization of pallets and other
transport aids is also very limited. There is no
available or manageable pallet pool for hire.
Finally, the quality of warehouse management is
suspect. High discrepancies in actual and
recorded inventory data, high damage and mis
sing rates, and a general lack of real-time
product and order tracking have forced manu
facturers to build (and operate) their own
facilities (Ho and Lim, 2001).

Distribution and Logistics Centers (Parks)
The absence of a modern, responsive ware
housing industry has led many MNC’s, operating
as joint ventures, to build their own warehousing
capacity or obtain such services from 3PL’s.
In the last 20 years, with the emergence
of “zero-storage” “logistics alliance” and
“logistics supply chain” concepts, the
logistics goals for warehouses have be
come to shorten turnover time, lower
storage rate and costs, and improve
services. Warehousing holds great signifi
cance as it provides a time factor between
raw materials, industrial goods and final
products. As corporations start to regard
customer service as an active and valueadded competitive tool, warehousing will
become more important. To achieve these
goals in warehousing, third party logis
tics service providers made a thorough
analysis of labor productivity and costs.
They focused on redesigning the ware
houses to build modern logistics centers
based on location models, and analyzed
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the planning and relocation of advanced
logistics centers to speed up the proces
sing of orders and to lower logistics costs
(Translated from Chinese, Liang and Yu,
2004).
MNC’s and foreign logistics service providers
could only have minority ownership of ware
housing and storage in a joint venture up to
2002. But in 2003, with the WTO accession,
foreign firms can have majority ownership of
warehousing and storage, and may operate
wholly-owned warehousing and storage subsidi
aries by 2005. Private, foreign-operated firms
after WTO accession may put government-run
facilities at a disadvantage. However, govern
ment and private companies are in a program of
building modern logistics centers in major cities.
This is at both the National and regional levels.
The government stills controls more than 90% of
the warehouses and has planned modernization
of the warehousing industry in China. The
Chinese government is planning to build 45 dis
tribution hubs throughout China over seven
years starting from 2002. These hubs operate
advanced warehouse management systems with
automated materials handling, cold storage and
customs clearance. There has been some concern
expressed about how capable these governmentrun centers will be in competing with foreign op
erated firms once the WTO agreed to relaxation
of foreign entry comes into effect (Government of
Canada, 2003).
According to the statistics from the State
Planning Commission, most cities have plans to
build more logistics parks in their region. The
Chinese government believes in consolidating
types of industrial activity in one area. Many local
governments have designated logistics as their
pillar industry. In order to encourage de
velopment in this industry, each government has
their favored policies. In the Yangtze River Delta
for example, the government nominates “Key
Logistics Firms,” based on the firm’s record of
good service and reputation. With this govern
ment recognition, these “key logistics firms” enjoy
favored policies which include (Chow et al., 2003):

•

Funding of logistics projects where the
government either guarantees the loan or
provides direct financing.

•

Relaxed market entry within Shanghai and
in Shenzhen for the Pearl River Delta. By
2005, when a substantial amount of China’s
WTO commitment will be realized, most
firms will be registered in Shanghai or Shen
zhen.

•

With municipality authorization, companies
are charged lower local business fees.

•

Favored land price. In China, land prices
differ for different land uses. The lowest price
level is charged for industrial usage, while
the highest is for commercial or trade pur
poses. When a company applies for the
building or development of a new logistics
park or project, it enjoys the lowest land
price level, the industrial land price.

In Shanghai, three major logistics parks have
been developed. They are the preferred locations
for logistics development in Shanghai. One of
them is WaiGaoQi Free Trade Zone adjacent to
the Shanghai Port, focusing mainly on export
logistics. There are 700 companies gathered
together along with warehouses and distribution
centers in this district. The second is PuDong
Logistics Park near the PuDong New Airport.
This logistics park focuses on air cargo and is
occupied by numerous airfreight logistics
companies. The third is the North-West Logistics
Park. At this location, most of the retail and
wholesale stores have their own distribution
centers. In addition, Shanghai is planning to
build a new port on the two Yangshan islands on
the southern border of Shanghai, which will
become another important seaport logistics
center in China.
However, while the government objective to
stimulate new business is a legitimate goal,
there is a danger in granting special privileges in
a non-transparent manner. The Shanghai
government has actually taken equity stakes in
some favored firms, granting them special privi

leges or financial assistance, or free advertising
for certain firms solely based on their friendships
with the government. For instance, government
protection within the air cargo handling business
has created a “duopoly” of two companies favored
with exclusive licenses to perform air cargo
ground handling services at the Pudong Airport.
This protection from competition has led to high
prices and poor performance relative to global
standards (American Chamber of Commerce,
2003).

The Prospect for Warehousing in China
Warehousing capacity and services are rapidly
improving to meet the needs of the MNC’s who
require modern facilities built for movement
rather than storage as well as value-added
services. The Chinese government’s active support
of distribution and logistics center development
and relaxation of regulations will increase both
capacity and quality in this sector. What is more
important, the government is actively promoting
organizational reform in SOE’s, which will
increase the outsourcing of non-core activities
such as transportation and warehousing, fuehng,
and the demand for a logistics services industry.
Foreign participation in rail, trucking, and other
logistics sectors such as customs brokerage and
forwarding are regulated. Unlike those sectors,
foreign participation in warehousing and logis
tics centers is encouraged (Wu, 2003). For
example, China’s leading 3PL’s are large foreign
companies licensed to operate as Wholly Foreign
Owned Entities (WFOE’s). Also growing in impor
tance are foreign companies that are currently
restricted to operating as joint venture partners
or through free trade zones (FTZ’s). In 2001, the
government of Shanghai’s Pudong New Area
lifted all restrictions on warehousing and logis
tics companies setting up operations in the
WaiGao Qaiao Bonded Zone, equalizing their
position with trading companies in the zone.
Foreign companies are now allowed to operate
these warehouses themselves to store a wide
variety of raw materials, parts and other fin
ished goods for onward sale and shipment into
China. In Wai Tao Qiao, foreign operators gener
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ally maintain high standard warehouses at their
manufacturing facilities, which can double as
regional distribution centers. A growing number
of providers are “one-stop-shops” that offer wide
ranging import services that extend beyond
logistics (Wu, 2003). At the same time, large
SOE’s in the logistics sector are actively
transforming themselves. There is substantial
evidence that they are determined to become
leading logistics providers, having initiated
restructuring plans to transform themselves
from basic service providers to 3PL’s. Often the
changes are in conjunction with a joint venture
or a less formal partnership with a foreign 3PL
that brings new management and information
technologies to the partnership.

SUMMARY AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR MNC’s
Multinational companies are taking advantage of
China’s manufacturing capabilities and require
logistics services both within the developed
coastal regions and inland. They also want to
capitalize on China’s growing domestic market.
One challenge will be to find reliable and fast
truck service in a fragmented, localized industry
that operates under a patchwork of local regula
tions. Another challenge will be to find rail
service in the capacity constrained and mostly
state owned rail network. Obtaining good distri
bution center service as opposed to warehousing
space is also difficult. China is making great
strides in providing new intercity highways, new
railway trackage and building modern distribu
tion facilities in logistics parks. However, the full
benefit of these massive infrastructure improve
ments will not be achieved if these assets are not
utilized effectively by the service providers them
selves.
The root problems that remain are primarily
managerial and inherent in the structure of
these logistic service sectors. An asset-based,
integrated network of either TL or LTL service
will not be forthcoming until local and provincial
regulations that restrict competition in trucking
are removed. These same barriers impede the
growth of larger scale firms which can better
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afford information technology. The railroad
monopoly that exists today is unlikely to disap
pear in the near future so change in the railway’s
operating practices and service priorities will
come about slowly. Only in the warehousing
sector, where there are both government invest
ment and relaxed entry to foreign operators can
major improvements in service levels and
capabilities be expected in the near term. MNC’s
now have more options to build their own
distribution facilities when for-hire services are
inadequate. The overall reality is that MNC’s
will find transportation and warehousing
services in China to be slower, less reliable, less
visible, less responsive, more expensive and
perhaps less available than in most Western
countries. MNC’s will have to plan their overall
distribution network and supply chains to
recognize these realities.
Many industry observers and even the Chinese
government sees the development of a healthy
and competitive third-party logistics industry as
one of the solutions to the lack of integrated and
professional trucking services. Wu (2003)
indicates that while foreign companies often
form a patchwork of partnerships with local
logistics and transportation operators to form
some sort of distribution network, few licenses
for transportation are granted for nationwide
operations (and even those are subject to
protectionist measures of local governments).
Thus, 3PL’s have emerged as a popular choice for
MNC’s seeking to move products across the
country. These include non-asset based as well
as asset-based 3PL’s who are knowledgeable of
local regulations and who can build relationships
with local logistics service suppliers in the truck
and warehouse sectors. Some of these 3PL’s are
large global logistics service providers who have
expanded their coverage in China by working
with many Chinese agents in order to provide
broad coverage of China. Others are SOE’s with
large transportation or warehousing assets
across the country such as Sinotrans, China Post
or China Material Storage and Transportation
Company who are seeking to modernize rapidly.
Many are regional transportation companies
which have successfully serviced important MNC

clients and leveraged their success into wider
operations and expanded services. Similarly,
some of the most successful 3PL’s have risen
from in-house logistics divisions that are lever
aging the logistics capabilities and network
developed for the parent company. Another
benefit of using established 3PL’s of significant
size is that they may be able to open the doors to
reliable rail service in corridors where they have
contracted out rail capacity. It may still be
unwise to only deal with one 3PL, as all the
provinces have different rules and regulations
and no one agent can provide full coverage. A
strategic solution is to focus on achieving depth,
rather than breadth, of market penetration. By
focusing activities on a single city or region, the
distribution problem is simplified.

area requiring logistics services. Such partners
will be able to identify potential pitfalls and will
have the network of business and government
contacts needed to do business in China. To
remain adaptable in China’s ever-changing
markets, it is advisable not to become overly
reliant on a single partner.
Partnerships between shipper and logistics ser
vice providers have long been offered in Western
economies as a means for achieving increased
productivity. In the Chinese transportation and
logistics environment, partnerships may be a
strategic necessity to ensure that products in
deed move to the right place at the right time at
the right cost.
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ENDNOTES
1. China’s 10th five year plan is for the period
2001 to 2005. These plans reflect the economic
development priorities of the country and
provide a blueprint and strategy for government
economic development and reform activity. The
first plan in 1953 targeted heavy industry. The
tenth five year plan focuses on information
technology but also identifies logistics as an
industry to develop.
2. Containerized trucks refer to closed van type
trucks versus open trucks such as flat decks or
“open bed” vehicles.
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